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The recrudescence of ‘security v. privacy’ after the 2015 terrorist 
attacks, and the value of ‘privacy rights’ in the European 
Union1 
Maria Grazia Porcedda 
University of Leeds, Centre for Criminal Justice Studies 
Abstract 
This article aims at rebutting the security v. privacy model in the European 
Union, by demonstrating the importance of ‘privacy rights’ in the Union 
and, contextually, defending the significance of the right to the protection 
of personal data. Accordingly, and in agreement with views of ‘privacy’ 
being an umbrella term, I demonstrate that requests to give up privacy 
may in fact entail giving up several entitlements. In the EU, such 
entitlements are divided into two qualified rights that must be looked at 
separately: respect for private and family life and protection of personal 
data. To give back value to both concepts, I adopt a law and society 
approach, whereby I use the work of sociologists and philosophers in a 
historical perspective. Thereby, I set about to highlight the reasons why 
both rights, as they emerged out of modernity, have become instrumental 
in fostering personhood – one’s unique identity, protected as an expression 
of dignity – and enabling that autonomy so crucial for democracy. The 
result of such an operation not only substantially alters the nature of the 
expression ‘security v. privacy’, but also it begs daring questions for the 
ordre public of the EU. 
 
 
1  I wish to thank Dr. Martyn Egan for his invaluable reflections and advice, 
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Furthermore, I am indebted to Professor Marise Cremona for the fruitful 
conversations that led me to reach a number of relevant conclusions in this article 
as part of my wider doctoral work. Finally, I would like to thank Elena Brodeala 
and Vivian Kube for their comments on an early draft, presented as a paper in the 




The revelations by Edward Snowden in the summer of 2013 seemed to 
have put a lid on the long decade of counterterrorism (Jenkins 2014) and 
related appeals to giving up ‘privacy’ in the name of security, the so-called 
trade-off between security and privacy. The pervasiveness of the various 
programmes perpetrated by the NSA with the support of like-minded 
European partners had demonstrated the risks of indiscriminate 
surveillance and intelligence-led policing. In its Agenda on Security, the 
European Commission (2015) clearly stated that security and fundamental 
rights are complementary policy objectives. 
But the ominous terrorist attacks that characterized 2015 wiped out all 
concerns foreshadowed by Snowden. The Council (2015) proposed to 
intensify existing data exchanges, as well as pursue a measure previously 
rejected, the collection of PNR data for intra-European Union (hereafter 
EU) flights.2 After suffering the attacks, France – an EU-founder – has 
followed in the US’ footsteps, by waging a war against terrorism, and 
proclaiming a state of emergency entailing a wide use of administrative 
police and justice, currently to last until July 2017 (since November 2015) 
(Jacquin 2016). The trade-off model, or its legal version of balancing, had 
merely been lurking, to re-emerge in due time. 
I join those commentators who find that the problem with the trade-off 
model lies in a misunderstanding of the meaning and values embodied by 
security and privacy (e.g. Huysman 2006; Waldron 2010; Solove 2011). 
While the importance of security tends to be inflated (e.g. Reiman 1995; 
Cohen 2013), the value of privacy as a moral3 and legal entitlement is 
overlooked. What seems to be forgotten is, in particular, privacy’s role in 
protecting “the individual’s interest in becoming, being, and remaining a 
person” (Reiman in Schoeman 1984, 314), i.e. personhood achieved 
through intimacy (inter alia Westin 1967; Schoeman 1984; Inness 1996) 
and paving the way to the objective of autonomy so much needed in 
democracy (Poullet/Rouvroy 2009; Simitis 2010; Cohen 2013). This 
 
 
2  Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, 
OJL 119 (PNR Directive). 
3  Reiman (1995) describes moral entitlements as those that (we believe) people 
should have irrespective of their legal acknowledgment.  
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article aims at rebutting the unfortunate foundations of balancing, by 
expounding the importance of ‘privacy rights’ in relation to the ordre 
public of contemporary EU. The latter is understood as a political 
community built to enforce peace and striving towards the rule of law. I 
aim to do so by following calls for an interdisciplinary approach to rights, 
particularly in sociology (Pugliese 1989; Bobbio 1997; Cohen 2013), with 
reference to the EU’s ordre public. I experiment with a law and society 
approach to speculate on the factors that enhanced the emerging of the 
limbs contained in the legal formulation of the rights to respect for private 
and family life and protection of personal data [1], and that challenged 
them [2]; and on the other hand, the mechanism that favoured a legal 
approach to the values underpinning both rights [3] and the political 
occurrences that subsequently spurred their recognition as rights [4]. I set 
to demonstrate the reasons why both rights have become instrumental in 
fostering personhood, one’s unique identity, protected as an expression of 
dignity, and enabling autonomy, as they emerged out of modernity. 
Contextually, I defend the significance and independence of the right to 
the protection of personal data. 
Accordingly, my chapter develops as follows. In section 1, I briefly 
revise ‘security v. privacy’, or the trade-off model, and introduce the 
three-stepped procedure that I will use to discuss the notion of privacy 
rights. In section 2, I expound that ‘privacy’ is an umbrella term, and that 
requests to give up privacy may in fact entail giving up several 
entitlements. In section 3, I unveil that, in the EU, privacy hides a double 
reference to two qualified rights which must be looked at separately: 
private and family life and personal data protection. Finally, in section 4 I 
add legal value to the notion through a law and society approach, by using 
work of sociologists and philosophers in a historical perspective. I 
conclude with implications for the trade-off model and the EU ordre 
public. 
1. Situating security and privacy in the trade-off model 
Before delving into the substance of my argument, it is appropriate to 
describe the trade-off model, a classic formulation of which is that by 
Posner and Vermeule (2007). The authors argue that security and liberty 
are comparable items that can be represented as two perpendicular axes 
delimiting an area of policy choices. Taking into account real-life scarcity 
of resources, and assuming that contemporary (US) governments are not 
 
 
“dysfunctional”, Posner and Vermeule (2007) argue that we have 
exhausted the policy options that enable us to simultaneously enhance 
security and liberty. Hence, a policy measure will require sacrificing one 
for the other, at the extreme in an all-or-nothing fashion (Solove 2007). 
The trade-off thesis, which, according to Posner and Vermeule, does not 
vouch for maximisation of security at all costs, is complemented by the 
so-called deference thesis. In a nutshell, at times of emergency, the 
executive does and should reduce civil liberties, because the latter hinder 
an effective response to the threat. 
In my view, Posner and Vermeule’s approach can be challenged on 
both normative and methodological grounds. Normatively, it can be 
shown why liberties should not be traded with security. Such critique is 
jurisdiction-specific, in that it has to be carried out with reference to the 
ordre public (understood as a constitutional order) of a specific country. A 
methodological challenge would rebut the claim whereby security and 
liberty are de facto juxtaposed (because we lie at the frontier) and that 
giving up liberty, in the guise of privacy, is the most efficient solution in 
the face of an emergency, by looking into whether privacy and security are 
the only dimensions at play in the trade-off model, and benchmarking the 
notion of efficiency.4 
The two critiques meet at the intersection of the definitions of security 
and privacy, which are at the same time the object of the methodological 
critique, and the norm-laden tools necessary to carry out such critique.(in 
other words, it could be said that security and privacy are philosophically 
thick concepts)5 Here I exactly wish to appraise the nature of the 
 
 
4  In this volume, Patrick Herron offers an account of several theoretical challenges 
against the trade-off model and an original change of perspective on liberties. 
Several interdisciplinary projects focussed on a methodological critique of a sort 
in search for alternative solutions. Among others, see the work of the 
SURVEILLE project (https://surveille.eui.eu/), the SurPRISE project 
(www.surprise-project.eu) and the PRISMS project (http://prismsproject.eu/) (all 
accessed 22 February 2016). 
5  In philosophy, ‘thin’ concepts are either descriptive or evaluative/normative, 
whereas ‘thick’ concepts are both descriptive and evaluative/normative. During 
her speech at the conference New Philosophical Perspectives on Surveillance and 
Control: Beyond the Privacy versus Security Debate (FRIAS, Freiburg, 5-6 
November 2015), Prof. Rafaela Hillerbrand noted that drawing evaluative 
conclusions based on thin descriptive concepts (and vice versa) does not produce 
a thick concept, but rather expresses a logical fallacy. The trade-off model may 
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juxtaposed concepts, which is often overlooked (Solove 2007; 2011) or 
misunderstood (Waldron 2010).  
One of the fallacies leading to such a misunderstanding is Solove’s 
(2011) pendulum argument. At times of emergency, the importance of the 
two concepts is re-assessed. Liberties such as privacy are seen as 
hindering security, and hence their enjoyment should be ‘temporarily’ 
compressed. The other side of the coin, epitomized by the war on terror, is 
that the threat to security is so fundamental as to justify the adoption of 
any measure, including the limitation of liberties. In this respect, it can be 
said that the trade-off model finds fertile ground in the securitization of 
risks or threats (Buzan et al. 1998), which consists exactly in attributing 
existential value to a particular threat justifying the adoption of any 
measure. In other words, there is a trade-off because the value of security 
swings towards its maximum level, becoming prized above anything else. 
The immediate advantage of securitization, namely prioritizing an issue 
on the political agenda, hinders an appraisal of the ensuing regulatory 
framework and policies (Huysman 2006). Likewise, securitization 
frustrates an open-minded reflection on the diverse factors surrounding 
security issues, such as the role played by technological constraints in 
dealing with threats.6 Hence, securitization precludes the methodological 
analysis necessary to prove whether trading security with privacy is the 
most efficient solution. As a result, security needs to be reappraised in a 
legally meaningful way. This can be done by substituting security with 
references to the measures adopted with a view to tackle offences 
embodying a specific criminal conduct. I return to this point in the 
concluding section. 
When considered within the trade-off model resting on the 
securitization of threats, the depth of rights is diluted, in that the reasons 
why they were originally safeguarded is suddenly overshadowed. The 
reverse mechanism takes place here: there is a trade-off because the value 
of privacy swings towards its minimum level, becoming an obstacle 
against achieving the most cherished objective. The case for privacy may 
be worsened by the fact that the right is presented (in policy discourses) as 
an excuse to cover misdeeds, or as resistance to intrusive practices carried 
out for security purposes (Solove 2011; González Fuster et al. 2013). 
 
transform security and privacy as thin concepts, though in different ways, and 
lead to several logical fallacies. 
6  In this sense, securitization transforms security in a thin-evaluative concept. In 
this volume, Orrù reaches similar conclusions. 
 
 
Hence attention focuses on the (desired) quantum of privacy:7 since we 
have or need little privacy, we can sacrifice it. To be sure, Scott 
McNealy’s infamous aphorism as the CEO of Sun Microsystems “you 
have zero privacy anyway” so “get over it” (Sprenger 1999) remains 
unmatched by politicians. Yet, the mantra that “if you have done nothing 
wrong, you have nothing to hide” (Solove 2007; 2011), works on the same 
reductive trail: since the quantum of privacy needed by law-abiding 
citizens is very limited, they should not be worried vis-à-vis the 
government’s attempt to intrude upon it. Undervaluing privacy flattens its 
other dimensions, in this case those concerning its value, and hinders an 
evaluation of the effects of a regulatory framework and policies limiting it. 
In order to seriously appraise the concept, we need to restore its full 
normative meaning. 
Although contesting the use of security and liberty as terms of 
reference, let alone their comparability, would be a valid exercise in any 
democratic society, the specific meaning of their dimensions, once 
unpacked, changes according to (legal) culture. This is because the range 
of available responses to threats (and values) are jurisdiction-specific; a 
similar claim can be made for rights, at least insofar as their interpretation 
is concerned. Hence, adding legal-descriptive purchase to security, and 
legal-normative meaning to privacy, is a contextual exercise. Since the 
importance of security in our contemporary European society seems 
unchallenged, I find more urgent to delve into the richness of the concept 
of privacy vis-à-vis the European Union ordre public, and what we stand 
to lose if we trade it for security. In this work, I look at the European 
Union ordre public as built on the telos of a solid application of the rule of 
law against the legacy of war-ridden fascist and totalitarian regimes.8 
The discussion, which develops previous work of mine (in Porcedda, 
Vermeulen and Scheinin 2013), builds on and integrates existing literature 
(inter alia, Reiman 1984; Schoeamn 1984; Inness 1996; Rodotà 2009; 
Poullet/Rouvroy 2009; Solove 2011; Cohen 2013; González Fuster et al. 
2013; Kreissl et al. 2013; Lynskey 2015). In order to render legal-
 
 
7  It could be said that securitization transforms privacy into a thin-descriptive 
concept. 
8  Borrowing from Fried, if “my sketch of this underlying perspective leaves the 
reader full of doubts and queries, I draw comfort from the fact that a more 
elaborate presentation” of this claim is in progress (Fried in Schoeman 1984, 
206). 
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normative meaning to privacy, I develop my argument in three steps. First, 
I unveil the slippery meaning of the term; second, I anchor the analysis in 
the EU legal framework, where privacy embodies two rights; and third, 
since this slippery meaning is connected to degrading the value inherent in 
the right, I set to add normative grip to it in (the EU) context. 
2. Privacy: one all-encompassing word, globally 
The first step to add normative grip is to show the complexity of ‘privacy’, 
irrespective of any jurisdiction.9 The birth of privacy as a legal concept is 
typically linked to the famous article written by Warren and Brandeis 
(1890) at the end of the 19th century. Quickly labelled as ‘the right to be 
let alone’, pursuant to an expression coined by Judge Cooley, privacy was 
initially subsumed under tort law,10 not least due to the circumstances that 
motivated Warren and Brandeis to write the article (see infra). 
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights11 (hereafter 
UDHR) gave privacy the seal of a legally acknowledged right in the 
signatory states. The formulation of article 12 UDHR was almost entirely 
transcribed into article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights12 (hereafter ICCPR), the first legally binding formulation 
of the right, which reads 
•! 1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks 
on his honour and reputation.  
•! 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks. 
 
 
9  Hence in this section I purposely do not refer to regional texts such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Council of Europe Convention 108, 
which will feature in later sections. 
10  Articulated by Prosser (1960). Privacy was initially addressed under tort law also 
in Germany, as recounted by Simitis (2010). 
11  General Assembly of the United Nations (1948) Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Resolution 217. 
12  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, I-14668, UNTS n° 999. 
 
 
The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations has avoided 
providing strict definitions of the dimensions of article 17,13 an approach 
followed by other courts on similar matters. According to commentators, 
privacy includes identity, integrity and intimacy, relating to the body, acts 
and information, and autonomy of action (Nowak 2005); family is broadly 
interpreted and understood as in the state party at stake;14 home is the 
place where one resides or works15 (Nowak 2005; Blair 2005); 
correspondence extends beyond letters. Honour and reputation are not 
defined, but are still protected from attack, e.g. as deriving from having 
one’s name and full contact details published on the UN Security 
Council’s terrorist list.16 Oftentimes ‘the right to privacy’ is used as a 
catch-all phrase to refer to all dimensions of article 17 ICCPR (Scheinin 
2009). 
At the times when the ICCPR was adopted, the consequences of applied 
informatics, particularly in relation to private and public uses of databases, 
triggered several scandals (Rodotà 1973; Newman 2008) that fuelled 
renewed policy attention on privacy. Alan Westin (1967) was the author 
of another popular definition of privacy, i.e. “the control over personal 
information” which could be processed in such databanks (although, in his 
treatise, he seems to broaden the scope beyond that definition17). Westin’s 
work was at the basis (González Fuster 2014) of the development of the 
‘fair information principles’ (Gellman 2012), which oversee the 
functioning of ‘information privacy’. Such understanding of privacy was 
given legal, if unbinding, substance by the OECD 1980 Privacy 
 
 
13  United Nations Human Rights Committee (1988) General Comment No. 16. The 
right to respect of privacy, family, home and correspondence, and protection of 
honour and reputation (Article 17). 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium, CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006, Communication No. 
1472/2006 (Human Rights Committee). 
17  His followers have paid little attention to a second definition of privacy which, in 
fact, encompasses the dimensions partly recognized by the law: “viewed in terms 
of the relation of the individual to social participation, privacy is the voluntary 
and temporary withdrawal of a person from the general society through physical 
or psychological means, either in a state of solitude, or small-group intimacy or, 
when among larger groups, in a condition of anonymity or reserve” (Westin 
1967, 5). 
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Guidelines, recently revised,18 which contain soft law concerning the 
control over information relating to any identified or identifiable 
individual (personal data according to article 1 (b) of the Annex). 
Westin’s work paved the way to a stream of studies that still thrives 
today; ever since, scholars have competed to provide the ultimate 
definition of privacy. Some authors searched for the dimensions of privacy 
worthy of protection. Westin found solitude, intimacy, anonymity and 
reserve (1967); Fried identified privacy as key for respect, love, friendship 
and trust (1984); Clarke (2006) isolated the privacy of the person, of 
behaviour, of personal communications and of personal data; Finn et al. 
(2013) added to Clarke’s list privacy of thoughts and feelings, of action, of 
image, of location and space and of association (including group privacy). 
Solove (2007) preferred taking inspiration from Wittgenstein’s concept of 
family resemblances, while Nissenbaum (2011) suggested concentrating 
on context, and Regan (2002) on privacy as a common good. 
I do not privilege any single author’s definition, as I take the view that 
privacy encompasses all abovementioned dimensions, including the goal 
of protecting personal data, which makes privacy, as González Fuster 
(2014) notes, inherently ambiguous. In this respect, I agree with the idea 
that privacy is an umbrella term19 (Solove 2007) and, as I detail later on, 
that it is fundamentally dynamic (Cohen 2013, 1906), because I belong in 
the group of authors, like Westin (1967), Reiman (1984), Gavison (1984), 
Inness (1996) and Cohen (2013) who consider privacy as instrumental to 
the development of identity/personhood based on intimacy and leading to 
autonomy. What is fundamental for the development of identity and 
personhood cannot be decided once and for all. Nonetheless, I agree with 
Bennett (2011) that, for all the scholarly criticism, the term has too much 
intellectual and political grip to be set aside. As a result, in the EU legal 
order it may be more correct to talk about ‘privacy rights’, with the 
constraints that I formulate below. 
 
 
18  Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development, Recommendation 
of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, C(80)58/FINAL, as amended on 11 July 
2013 by C(2013)79. 
19  Though compare Andrade’s (2011) criticism of the superimposition between 
‘privacy’, ‘data protection’ and personal identity. According to him, the role of 
such an umbrella term should be performed by ‘personal identity’ instead. 
 
 
3 ‘Privacy rights’ in the European Union 
The second operation needed to add normative grip to ‘privacy’ is to 
anchor it in the EU legal framework, where, despite its appeal, the concept 
bears uncertain legal significance. 
In Hungary v. Slovak Republic, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (hereafter CJEU) recalled that “EU law must be interpreted in the 
light of the relevant rules of international law, since international law is 
part of the European Union legal order and is binding on the 
institutions”,20 and therefore the formulation in article 17 ICCPR cannot 
be, and has not been, ignored. However, the EU is not party to the ICCPR, 
and even if it were, the parts thereof which are not customary in nature 
(Cremona 2006) would not supersede written primary law such as the 
Charter (Rosas/Armati 2010) but rather, as the CJEU has held, e.g. in 
Wachauf, “supply guidelines to which regard should be had”.21 The same 
argument can be made in relation to Convention 108.22 
As the seminal work carried out by González Fuster (2014) 
demonstrates, no mention is made of ‘privacy’ in primary law; as for 
secondary law, privacy is inconsistently referred to, alongside the 
 
 
20  Judgment of 16 October 2012 in Hungary v Slovakia, C-364/10, EU:C:2012:630 
para 44. 
21  Judgment of 13 July 1989 in Wachauf v Bundesamt Für Ernährung Und 
Forstwirtschaft, C-5/88, EU:C:1989:321 para 17. 
22  Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, CETS n° 108, 28 January 1981. 
Convention 108 is a sui generis case. Directive 95/46/EC contains a connection 
or renvoi (Cremona 2016) that underscores the relevance of Convention 108 in 
the Union legal order. As important, Convention 108 was amended in 1999 to 
enable the European Union to become party to it (yet no action was taken on the 
point). At the time of writing, Convention 108 is under revision, and the EU is 
taking active part in the negotiation (available at: 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?
documentId=09000016806a616c). Should the EU become a party to the revised 
Convention, then the instrument would become integral part of EU law and 
impose an obligation of conform interpretation of secondary law to avoid 
conflict. In its preamble, the GDPR, which can be seen as a specification of the 
right to personal data protection read in the light of article 52.2 of the Charter and 
the CJEU’s case law in Google Spain, does not contain connection clauses to 
Convention 108. However, pursuant to recital 105 of the GDPR, adherence to 
Convention 108 should be taken into account when assessing the adequacy of 
third states’ data protection legislation, and therefore Convention 108 could be 
seen as providing minimum standards. 
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expressions ‘private life’ and ‘protection of personal data’; the same can 
be said of judgments interpreting such secondary law.23 González Fuster 
notes that translations of applicable law betray an even more inconsistent 
use of terms. The General Data Protection Regulation24 (hereafter GDPR) 
replacing Directive 95/46/EC,25 currently overseeing the protection of “the 
right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data” (with 
language taken directly from Convention 10826), will contain no 
references to privacy as such. 
In the EU legal order, the various dimensions encompassed by ‘privacy’ 
are divided into two qualified rights (i.e. susceptible of being subject to 
permissible limitations), both enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (Rosas and Armati 2010). Article 7 on 
 
 
23  Numerous examples can be found of unclear or perplexing uses of the term. In 
Digital Rights Ireland and others, the Court states “to establish the existence of 
an interference with the fundamental right to privacy, it does not matter whether 
the information on the private lives concerned is sensitive or whether the persons 
concerned have been inconvenienced in any way”. That passage is taken, in turn, 
from ground 75 of the Judgment of 20 May 2003 in Österreichischer Rundfunk 
and Others, Joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01, EU:C:2003:294, and 
is misquoted, in that the original referred to ‘private life’ instead of privacy. In 
Judgment of 16 October 2012 in Commission v Austria, C-614/10, 
EU:C:2012:631, the ECJ stated that supervisory authorities are the guardians of 
an unspecified “right to privacy” (para 52); in Judgment of 12 December 2013 in 
X, C-486/12, EU:C:2013:836 the Court referred to “the importance – highlighted 
in recitals 2 and 10 in the preamble to Directive 95/46 – of protecting privacy, 
emphasised in the case-law of the Court and enshrined in Article 8 of the 
Charter” (para 29). In a rather surprising passage in Judgment of 17 July 2014 in 
YS and others, Joined cases C-141/12 and C-372/12, EU:C:2014:2081, para 44, 
the Court stated “As regards those rights of the data subject, referred to in 
Directive 95/46, it must be noted that the protection of the fundamental right to 
respect for private life means, inter alia, that that person may be certain that the 
personal data concerning him are correct and that they are processed in a lawful 
manner”. 
24  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119/1. 
25  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data (Data Protection Directive) OJ L 
281. 
26  Yet, for the current discussion, it is relevant to note that the revised draft of 
Convention 108 seems to substantially reduce references to ‘privacy’. 
 
 
respect for private and family life derives from article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (hereafter ECHR),27 which in turn is rooted 
in article 12 UDHR (European Commission of Human Rights 1956). 
Article 8 on the protection of personal data embodies those elements of 
privacy that pertain to personal information and the free flow thereof, 
which are currently dealt with by Directives 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC,28 
but without the connection to the internal market. The right, now 
enshrined in article 16 TFEU and 39 TEU, seems to be a disputed child, 
with many potential parents including former article 286 EC, and 
Convention 108.29 
González Fuster (2014) and Lynskey (2015) rightly note that scholars 
who wish to treat the two rights separately have to justify the 
independence of personal data protection from article 7 of the Charter.30 
To an extent, my own analysis will not differ. Part of the problem in 
dealing with the matter is that, before the Charter became legally binding, 
the CJEU could only rely on article 8 ECHR, which encompasses not only 
the traditional and the informational dimensions of privacy, but also 
elements, such as environmental protection, which are not associated with 
article 7 of the Charter at all. A second problem lies in the unfortunate 
formulation of Directive 95/46/EC (the right to privacy with respect to the 
processing of personal data), which has understandably been replicated in 
judgments on the subject matter. Very few judgments of the CJEU, thus 
far, concern article 8 taken alone, e.g. Deutsche Telekom,31 Scarlet 
Extended,32 and Sabam.33 Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe’s 
opinion on the Tele2 Sverige case, in which he argued incidentally that 
 
 
27  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as 
amended by Protocols No 11 and 14), ETS n° 005. Article 8 ECHR contains no 
reference to the word ‘privacy’. 
28  Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 
2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector, OJ L 201 (e-privacy Directive). 
29  European Parliament, Council and Commission, Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, OJ C 303/01. European Parliament, Council and 
Commission, Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 
303/02 (Explanations to the Charter). 
30  See, for instance, Lynskey (2015). 
31  Judgment of 5 May 2011 in Deutsche Telekom, C-543/09, EU:C:2011:279. 
32  Judgment of 24 November 2011 in Scarlet Extended, C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771. 
33  Judgment of 16 February 201 in Sabam, C-360/10, EU:C:2012:85. 
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article 8 of the Charter does not correspond to any rights guaranteed by the 
ECHR,34 may possibly positively influence the Court’s approach. 
From the perspective of black letter law, the fact that two rights exist, 
and that personal data protection is further enshrined in both Treaties, 
should be a sufficient reason to accept the legitimacy of both rights (and 
the reference to personal data protection as fundamental (González Fuster 
2014). 
Furthermore, it could be useful to recall that, in the European Union 
legal order, personal data protection may have had more prominence than 
the respect for private life, due to the  internal market dimension of the 
former, particularly in enabling the free flow of personal data.35 Although 
it was not a fundamental right, in Fisher the Court said that the principles 
enshrined in Directive 95/46/EC transposed into EC law general principles 
that already existed at member states level.36 On the other hand, while 
respect for private and family life was a right common to the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States, and seen as being part of 
the general principles of EU law as early as in the National Panasonic 
decision37 (Kokott/Sobotta 2013), the right was only relevant in the 
context of restrictions on the freedom of movement and family 
reunification. 
González Fuster (2014) notes the instrumental role played by both 
rights in the pursuit of the four freedoms. While personal data protection 
was a limitation against, but also a protection to enable, the free flow of 
data and the services relying on them, the right to family life went in the 
direction of supporting freedom of movement. However, the Lisbon 
Treaty marks the end of the instrumental character of the two rights, which 
acquire a life of their own. As the EU has embraced new competences in 
the criminal area, viz. of providing an area of security (articles 3 and 21 
TEU), both rights have acquired full, and possibly equal, weight. The 
 
 
34  Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe of 19 July 2016 in Tele2 Sverige and 
Watson and others, Joined cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, EU:C:2016:572 para 
79. 
35  But Poullet and Rouvroy (2009) argue that the fundamental rights dimension 
always prevailed. For a discussion of the double nature of Directive 95/46/EC 
and the implications for its legal basis, see Lynskey (2015). 
36  Judgment of 14 September 2000 in Fisher, Case C-369/98, EU:C:2000:443 para 
34. 




potential of greater interference with personal autonomy means that the 
importance of respecting private and family life transcends the field of 
freedom of movement. Likewise, protecting personal data is more 
important vis-à-vis intelligence-led policing and profiling (and erosion 
coming from the private sector38). 
4 Adding normative value to the two ‘privacy rights’ in the EU 
After having legally situated the right to privacy, as a final step to 
challenging the reductive approach to privacy in the trade-off model, I 
elaborate the normative value of privacy as understood in the EU. In other 
words, here I discuss what ‘privacy rights’ are protecting, where such role 
comes from, and why it matters in the contemporary European democratic 
society (vis-à-vis pressing requests to give it up). To this effect, I follow a 
law and society approach, and particularly the idea of Bobbio (1997) and 
Pugliese (1989), whereby the importance of any right can only be 
understood in the light of the social circumstances determining its 
appearance.39 Like all other liberties, the two privacy rights were effected 
by the emergence of new needs resulting from societal, cultural and 
technological developments. 
While implicit in the legal works relating to ‘privacy’ in the EU, such 
references are not delved into (inter alia Poullet/Rouvroy 2009; González 
Fuster et al. 2013; Lynskey 2015), to the detriment of the understanding of 
the value of both rights (particularly pronounced with reference to 
personal data protection). I intend to fill the gap to confer importance to 
privacy again, with a view to demonstrating its valuable relation with the 
EU ordre public. 
By looking into those original needs, it also becomes possible to 
embrace without risk of contradiction the connections between the rights 
to private life and to the protection of personal data. Indeed, 
acknowledging that the latter is independent from the right to private life 
 
 
38  In this respect, see the interesting analysis of Cohen (2013). 
39  For a discussion of the deep ties between sociology and human rights, see 
Brunsma et al. (2013). In the same vein, I agree with Cohen’s appeal to look into 
other disciplines to explain the value of privacy, or, as it should be more correct 
to say, rediscover such interdisciplinary approach, which was visible in early, but 
often neglected, work. 
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does not exclude an area of overlap (unsurprising per se as 
interdependence is part of the doctrine of human rights). Understanding 
this area of overlap may also help explaining why the international notion 
of privacy has come to embrace the goal of personal data protection. Both 
rights, in fact, are instrumental in fostering personhood, one’s unique 
identity, 40 protected as an expression of dignity, and enabling autonomy 
as concepts emerged out of modernity. 
4.1 Giving normative depth to the right to private and family life (art. 7) 
Article 7 of the Charter reads: “Everyone has the right to respect for his or 
her private and family life, home and communications”. In the intention of 
the European legislator (article 52.3 of the Charter), Article 7 derives from 
and corresponds to article 8 ECHR. The latter is rooted in article 12 of the 
UDHR, but the drafters of article 8 ECHR chose the English expression 
‘private life’ instead of ‘privacy’ as the English translation of the French 
vie privée (adding to the babel of formulations pointed at by González 
Fuster (2014)). Unfortunately the travaux préparatoires of article 12 
UDHR contain scant details of the discussions leading to the adoption of 
the right. Similarly, the drafters of article 8 ECHR left to future 
generations limited cues for the rationale for enshrining the right in the 
Convention. Perhaps this could relate to the lack of substantial 
philosophical debates on privacy reported by Schoeman (1984) that 
continued until the 1960s. A law and society approach is in this case 
inevitable, in the attempt to trace back the roots of the right in the near 
past, and relate such an approach to the enlightening, yet constantly 
evolving interpretations provided, for instance, on article 8 ECHR by the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR). I do so by reflecting 
 
 
40  A different opinion is expressed by Andrade (2011). For him, privacy and 
identity, which are both substantive rights, can be at odds, because they express 
two different elements of a broader right to personality. The protection of 
personal data, which is a procedural right, should be subsumed under a right to 
identity, as distinct from the right to privacy. While the distinction between 
personality and identity could add an interesting analytical layer, I believe that 
Andrade’s analysis could have led to different conclusions if it had been based on 
a deeper parsing of the legal and moral conceptual elements of privacy rights. 
After a deeper reading, in fact, privacy rights prove capable of protecting the 
possibility of change and of multiple identities. 
 
 
on each of the four limbs contained in the legal formulation of the right. I 
begin with the one closest to ‘privacy’, private life, the discussion of 
which also lays the foundations for the approach to the other three limbs, 
in the sense that I analyse the remaining three limbs in the light of the 
outcome of the discussion concerning private life. 
4.1.1 The right’s first limb: private life 
The acknowledgment of the existence of private life predates the 
appearance of the right, and can be traced back to the Greek polis, so that 
it would seem tempting to discuss it by contrast with its antonym ‘public’. 
Following this temptation to reflect on the model of the Greek polis would 
lead down a dead-end, as Arendt (1998) brilliantly expounded. In the 
ancient Greek civilization, the private coincided with the household, 
which was at once necessary for men to be free and take part as peers in 
the public affairs of the city, but also despised as a domain of deprivation 
from the most quintessentially human achievement of excellence through 
speech.41 Public life, where few enjoyed equality and liberty, could only 
be practised by those who were relieved from the need to earn their living, 
something enabled by the (productive) household. The household was in 
turn the seat of inequality, and to maintain said inequality, the male leader 
was entitled to use violence against family members, slaves and 
employees alike.42 The household carried with it a sense of deprivation, of 




41  Arendt maintains that Aristotle’s adage that ‘man is by nature political, that is 
social’, is the result of a mistranslation. ‘Social’, the need of company, was a 
concept produced by the Romans, who showed more respect for life in the 
household. For Arendt, such wrong reading is supported by the fact that today’s 
society is organized in the guise of an enormous family whose primary concern is 
production and survival. 
42  Unfortunately the home can still be the theatre of unequal relationships and 
violence toward women and children, a feature that has led scholars to identify 
‘privacy’ as the excuse for patriarchal domination. On this point, see Schoeman 
(1984). I believe, however, that this comes from the unfortunate, but not 
uncommon, conflation of ‘privacy’ with ‘secrecy’, i.e. forbidding disclosure 
because of a superior cause, as discussed by Westin (1967). 
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This is not what Warren and Brandeis referred to in their article. The 
authors described privacy as an emerging societal, moral and 
philosophical need in search for legal protection, “a right to personality” 
or identity, namely the expression of one’s life, such as emotions, 
sentiments, facts of life, happenings, actions, sexual life and relationships 
with others (implicitly unobserved). The authors believe protecting private 
life, as personality or identity connected to intimacy, to be a young need. 
The point is not that personality or intimacy had never existed before, but 
that, as Westin (1967) noted, it is precisely when these features are both 
enhanced and threatened – whether because they become matter of public 
enquiry (Warren/Brandeis), policy (Arendt) or intrusion (Westin) – that 
they become cherished values requiring legal protection, and enter the 
realm of freedom. Private life lost its meaning of deprivation in 
concomitance with the “enrichment of the private sphere through modern 
individualism” (Arendt 1998), underpinned by the elevation of intimacy to 
a value. 
I believe a succinct account of the social circumstances effecting such 
changes is necessary to appraise the extent to which the values 
undergirded by private life matter in today’s society. To do so, I adopt the 
views of Charles Taylor (1992, 1989) and Hannah Arendt (1998, 1960) 
concerning late modernity, and Westin’s (and Arendt’s) early work on 
intimacy that laid the basis for later discussions (inter alia Schoeman 
1984; Inness 1996; Cohen 2013).43 Such account entails four moves 
recalling, on the one hand, the factors that enhanced the surfacing of a 
given dimension of private life [1], and that challenged them [2]; and on 
the other hand, the mechanism that favoured a legal approach to the 
concept [3] and the political occurrences that subsequently spurred its 
recognition as a right [4]. 
I begin with the enhancing factors [1]. With the passage to modernity, 
identity stopped being attached to the role inherited at birth, and the 
former was no longer implicitly recognized. Detaching one’s identity from 
one’s social role was effected by the idea of authenticity, i.e. of one’s 
originality. This, according to Taylor, found its roots in the idea that the 
concepts of right or wrong were anchored in human feelings, in “a voice 
within” (Taylor 1992, 26), which is to be listened to if one wants to live a 
 
 
43  For a different path leading to the conclusion that the importance of identity and 
personality emerged in the XIX Century, see Andrade (2011). 
 
 
full life. Such idea, which at the beginning was conceived of as a way to 
connect to God, lost its religious connotations and came to be associated 
with intimacy enjoyed in private, whose first advocate was Rousseau 
(Arendt 1998). To be sure, intimacy had always existed, and according to 
Westin (1967), it is a quintessentially animal need used in a dialectic 
manner with sociality. Intimacy is a distance-setting mechanism (within 
the same species) to reproduce, breed, play and learn, whereas sociality is 
interpreted as being a desire for stimulation by fellows. Patterns of privacy 
and sociality at the levels of the individual, household and community are 
expressed in different forms in all cultures of the world. Westin refers 
widely to anthropological work, showing how different devices (Tuaregs’ 
veils, humour, backslapping, fans, or sunglasses) perform the function of 
distance-setting, the symbolic realization of privacy and withdrawal from 
society. Reserve, as well as the existence of intimacy, serve the double 
function of allowing the development of one’s personality by making 
sense of the different roles played by the individual in a community 
(Murphy 1964),44 and the safeguarding of one’s social status. Taylor notes 
that the notion of authenticity was fully developed by the father of 
Romanticism, Johann Herder, according to whom every human being is 
intrinsically different and original, and has to be true to herself, i.e. live 
her life her way, as a goal in life, against an instrumental approach to 
one’s life and the levelling demands of the community. This leads to the 
second move. 
Indeed, as mentioned above, while modernity enabled the liberation of 
the self, the appearance of the nation state, society, and technology 
threatened reserve and intimacy [2]. Major organizational changes 
 
 
44  The point has been then taken in the contributions edited by Schoeman, where for 
instance Jeffrey H. Reiman argues: “the relationship between privacy and 
personhood is a twofold one. First, the social ritual of privacy seems an essential 
ingredient in the process by which ‘persons’ are created out of pre-personal 
infants. It conveys to the developing child the recognition that his body to which 
he is uniquely ‘connected’ is a body over which he has some exclusive moral 
rights. Secondly, the social ritual of privacy confirms, and demonstrates respect 
for, the personhood of already developed persons.” He refers to both as 
“conferring title to one’s existence” and further claims “to the extent that we 
believe that the creation of ‘selves’ or ‘persons’ is an ongoing social 
process…the two dimensions become one: privacy is a condition of the original 
and continuing creation of ‘selves’ and ‘persons’” (1984, 310). See also Inness 
(1996) and Cohen (2013). 
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begetting the nation state unleashed the need to intrude into the private 
sphere in a more extensive way (Westin 1967), aided by the evolution of 
public and private bureaucratic practices, notably explained in the work of 
Weber. Similarly, society emerged when economic activities previously 
confined to the household became a source of concern for the public 
realm. Hence, the household – the social – was elevated to the public 
(Arendt 1998). In other words, the social realm infused and occupied the 
space of politics, thus suffocating both politics and private life, and 
placing levelling demands of conformism. This both threatened and 
spurred intimacy as the antidote against such demands of conformity. 
In this respect, Warren and Brandeis’ idea of ‘being let alone’ could be 
one extreme of the spectrum, coinciding with the choice of excluding any 
‘significant others’ from one’s life.45 As for the emergent consequences of 
technological progress, that is, in my view, what spurred Warren and 
Brandeis’ contribution.46 The article contains references to the 
improvement of long-distance photography and the proliferation of 
sensational periodicals47 (the development of the press stemming from the 
organizational changes above). Warren and Brandeis were writing to 
protest against the increasing intrusion of the press suffered by Warren 
into his family affairs, due to the fact that he had entered a politically 
powerful family by means of marriage. As documented by Gajda (2007), 
Warren had married Mabel Bayard, a US Senator’s daughter. However, 
differently from the classic account of the origins of the famous essay 
given by Prosser (1960), it was neither Warren, nor his wedding, who was 
the immediate object of attention, but rather his wife and father-in-law, 
who became himself the focus of gossip columns when he married a lady 
twenty years younger. From 1882 until 1890, detailed and variously 
intrusive accounts of the Warren-Bayard family life featured or were 
 
 
45  But Taylor (1992) acknowledged that even the hermit and the solitary artist are 
engaged in a form of dialogue: the former with God, and the latter with the future 
public who will admire the artist’s works. 
46  And, in agreement with Andrade (2011), the development of identity (Andrade 
rightly points out that our description of the evolution of mankind, from 
Paleolithic to the Information Age, is marked by different stages of technological 
development). 
47  By means of example “If you may not reproduce a woman's face 
photographically without her consent, how much less should be tolerated the 
reproduction of her face, her form, and her actions, by graphic descriptions 
colored to suit a gross and depraved imagination.” (Warren and Brandeis 1890). 
 
 
mentioned 60 times, often in gossip columns or front page, by the most 
circulated newspapers, and the ‘Right to Privacy’ had no practical effect 
over media attention, including the coverage of Warren’s own death 
twenty years later (Gajda 2007). 
Yet, these developments were not sufficient for the newly discovered 
values to become legally relevant. Another change was needed: the 
redistribution of the positive effects of modern individualism thanks to the 
telos of equality of recognition spurred by dignity [3]. Taylor recounts that 
dignity was the product of modernity linked with the evolving sources of 
legitimation of the polity and substituting honour. Honour, automatically 
recognized at birth to few, was previously the basis of pre-determined, 
social hierarchies ruled by natural law, whereby life was respected in 
abidance by a superior law. The new social contract that paved the way to 
democracy hinged on the idea of universal, natural (subjective) rights, 
whereby life is respected because of the intrinsic value of human beings 
(Taylor 1989). Such equal value carried recognition– the social policy of 
equal recognition, through procedural justice or fairness – and “is now 
universally acknowledged in one form or another” (Taylor 1992, 49), to 
the point that its denial can be perceived as discriminatory. Dignity, the 
sense of self-worth, is a cornerstone of contemporary legal and political 
systems: it calls for respect which is accorded to all, and what commands 
respect is the very fact of being a human being. Respect has also an active 
meaning, in terms of subjective rights, of freedom and self-control (Taylor 
1989; Reiman 1984). Indeed, the combined effect of respect for dignity 
and uniqueness paved the way to the value of autonomy, which stems 
from what, according to Taylor, seems to be the strongest moral concerns 
of our time: the respect for life, integrity, and well-being of human beings, 
which grew from Locke through to Romanticism. “To talk of 
universal…rights is to connect respect for human life and integrity with 
the notion of autonomy. It is to conceive people as active co-operators in 
establishing and ensuring the respect that is due them. This…goes along 
with…the conception of what it is to respect someone. Autonomy is now 
central to this…For us respecting personality involves as a crucial feature 
respecting the person’s moral autonomy” (Talor 1989, 12). 
This leads to the final and decisive move [4]. Fascist and totalitarian 
regimes demonstrated the dangerous consequences of crushing reserve, 
intimacy and autonomy, and eased the transition of ‘privacy’ from a legal 
category to a fundamental right, from privilege of the élite to a human 
right. The ideologies supporting fascist and totalitarian regimes aimed at 
regimenting individuals, in pursuit of a corporatist society where the 
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single is a function of the total (Bobbio 1997). Autonomy, understood as 
non-conforming action (Arendt 1998), is instead seen as quintessential to 
the continuity of democracy. This is the value of private life implicit in the 
right, and defended by the courts. In Pretty v. UK, the ECtHR said “the 
notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the 
interpretation of its guarantees”.48 The import of this for our EU 
democratic society is recalled in the last part of this article. 
4.1.2 The right’s second limb: family life 
Before continuing, I must recall that I revise the value of family life, like 
the remaining limbs of article 7 of the Charter, in relation to my main 
argument, i.e. that they are instrumental to personhood, identity and 
autonomy as the quintessential function of the right, and not to the wider 
concept of the creation of family, which forms the object of different 
rights.49 As a result of such restricted focus, the application of the four 
steps of the methodology is necessarily less extended. 
Privacy is neither absolute, nor is it exhausted by intimacy. On the one 
hand, intimacy and reserve enjoyed in private enable us to maintain 
consistency among the roles played in the face of change, giving sense to 
one’s biography (Bagnasco et al. 2001, 167). On the other hand, Westin 
(1967) reminds us how such mechanisms are in dialogue with the need for 
sociality (and even societal surveillance as a mechanism to enforce 
norms). One’s identity results in particular from the interaction between 
the mechanism of identification (the sense of belonging to a group) and 
individuation (defining oneself against the external world and those that 
do not form part of our group). The development of one’s identity could 
be said to concretize in being able to answer the question “who am I?” 
 
 
48  Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, CE:ECHR:2002:0429JUD00234602 
para 61. 
49  For instance, article 9 of the Charter protects the right to marry and to found a 
family, whereas article 24 concerns the broad rights of the child. An investigation 
of how the creation of a family can be encouraged or hindered by social factors is 
beyond the scope of this study. For suggestions of how the wider subject of 
family could be tackled with a law and society approach see, for the American 
context, Hattery and Smith (2013). It must be highlighted that the debate of how 
socio-economic factors, including gender, impact on family types, marriage 
patterns, and family formation is heated (Kertzer 1991; Puschman/Solli 2014). 
 
 
(Bagnasco et al. 2001, 167). Identity is defined through dialogue, by using 
“human languages of expression” (Taylor 1992, 33) to interact with 
‘significant others’, throughout one’s lifetime. Significant others try to 
recognize a certain identity in us, and it is in dialogue with significant 
others that we define ourselves. Such dialogue starts early in life, through 
different stages of socialization, the first of which takes place in the 
family. 
Family is in fact another crucial component of the private realm. Family 
is patently the most basic human formation, or community, in which 
people find themselves, and to which they cling for necessity and survival. 
Similarly to private life, family life has lost its privative connotation in 
parallel with two cultural changes of utmost relevance today. Here I 
highlight the enhancing and limiting factors that led to the legal 
significance of family life. 
First, Taylor (1989) reminds that one of the most fundamental 
interactions for identity is that of love. The increasing possibility to 
choose freely one’s partner, which places love at the heart of the family, 
makes family life instrumental to the development of identity. Second, the 
period of reformation made ‘ordinary life’ more valuable than previous 
modes of living. Accordingly, the good life was identified with everyday 
life, spent in the family and in one’s productive activity, in worship of god 
(Taylor 1989) or, from the 19th century, focussing on enjoying the small, 
charming things (Arendt 1998) [1]. 
In parallel to private life, fascist and totalitarian regimes also tried 
crushing family life, which should have either mirrored the organization of 
the regime, or be annihilated; the prohibition of interracial marriages, as 
well as using children to report non-conforming political activities of 
parents, showed the risks of annihilating the protection afforded to the 
family [2]. Indeed, such experiences were among the reasons used in 
support of the adoption of article 8 ECHR as described in the travaux 
préparatoires (European Commission of Human Rights 1956) [4].  
The importance of enjoying life with one’s partner, and spending time 
with the family, is confirmed by secondary legislation on family 
reunification recognized, for instance, in relation to citizens taking 
advantage of the freedom of movement pursuant to article 21 TFEU.50 In 
 
 
50  In Runevič, the CJEU acknowledged that protection of the family has been 
instrumental in eliminating “obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental 
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Metock, the ECJ referred to “normal family life”,51 which is in line with 
(mostly) consistent case law on the matter [3].52 Glendon notes how 
family life, self-determination and individual privacy contributed over 
time to deregulation, stressing her concern that the retreat of law can 
foment an undue prevalence of private power relations; “where general 
ideas about the conduct of family life are expressed in the law, they are 
bland and ‘neutral’, capacious enough to embrace a variety of attitudes 
and lifestyles” (1989, 145). Yet, current sociological research can help 
showing that shifting meaning does not equal loss of importance.53 In 
keeping with the argument presented here, embracing wider 
understandings of family life (without lessening protection against the 
potential shortcomings of unleashed private power relations) can pave the 
way to greater autonomy, as is the case of same-sex couples and the 
termination of abusive relationships. The words of a recent ECtHR 
judgment could support this view, in particular “…The State, in its choice 
of means designed to protect the family and secure respect for family life 
as required by Article 8, must necessarily take into account developments 
in society and changes in the perception of social, civil-status and 
relational issues, including the fact that there is not just one way or one 
choice when it comes to leading one’s family or private life”.54 
  
 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty” (Judgment of 12 May 2011 in Runevič-
Vardyn and Wardyn, C-391/09, EU:C:2011:291, paragraph 90). The CJEU also 
noted the negative impact of certain policies on family life, for instance the 
freezing of funds (Judgment of 6 June 2013 in Ayadi v Commission, C-183/12 P, 
EU:C:2013:369 , paragraph 68). The ECJ adjudicated on family issues also in 
the context of cooperation in civil matters. There, it has ruled that the 
determination of what constitutes ‘family environment’ can be linked with the 
concept of habitual residence (Judgment of 22 December 2010 in Mercredi, C-
497/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:829, paragraph 56). 
51  Judgment of 25 July 2008 in Metock and Others,C-127/08, EU:C:2008:449 paras 
62 to 64. 
52  For further discussions, see Coutts (2015). 
53  With reference to the American case, Hattery and Smith (2013) note that the 
shifting understanding of what family means does not subtract from its 
importance, but simply that its meaning evolves in line with societal changes. 




4.1.3 The right’s third limb: home 
As clarified in the case of family life, I revise the value of home in relation 
to my main argument, i.e. its support to personhood, identity and 
autonomy as the quintessential function of the right. Moreover, it should 
be immediately clarified that the typical understanding of respect for home 
in article 7 of the Charter concerns its inviolability, rather than the right to 
a home (which would fall within social rights). As a result of such 
restricted focus, the application of the four-step methodology (the factors 
that enhanced the appearance of this limb of the right [1], and that 
challenged them [2]; and on the other hand, the mechanism that favoured a 
legal approach to the concept [3] and the political occurrences that 
subsequently spurred its recognition as a right [4]) is necessarily less 
extended. 
The home is typically the seat of the household,55 where private and 
family life takes place (although not solely, as the case law of the ECtHR 
shows). For Arendt (1998), home, in the sense of possessing (owning) 
one’s private space, may actually be the ancient Greeks' only legacy 
retained as it was in today’s concept of privacy.  
Edward Coke’s famous statement “A man’s home is his castle – for 
where shall he be safe if it not be in his house?” (sometimes said to 
originate in ancient Rome) has turned home into a safe haven against 
public power (authority). The origins of such a conception of the home 
connect to trespass of chattels and the Castle Doctrine.56 In this sense, the 
home was the first to acquire legal protection, even before the legal 
discovery of privacy. The travaux préparatoires of article 12 UDHR 
testify to how several countries had granted constitutional protection to the 
inviolability of the home before the adoption of the Declaration (Morsink 
1999) [1, 4]. 
The possibility for the home to become the place where one can also 
enjoy private and family life, by hiding from the public eye (the social), is 
 
 
55  As opposed to the house, which is generally regarded as simply a building 
(Westin 1967, p. 5). 
56  The writ of habeas corpus (protection against illegal deprivation of liberty) could 
be seen as a logical antecedent of the protection of the home, as individuals 
needed first to be granted physical protection. However, to establish such a link, 
more research is needed. 
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more recent, as it depends on the concrete availability of seclusion [1].57 
Suffice to note here that, for the very large majority of the population, the 
availability of seclusion is connected to sociological and demographic 
changes: the shrinking of the family; the improvement of standards of 
living and better dwellings; more affordable heating and lighting allowing 
people to spend time in separate rooms; and the appearance of modern 
bathrooms that changed hygienic customs into private rituals (Ward 
1999). Currently, there seems to be a recrudescence of the high-density 
cities that hindered seclusion, where people live close together, creating 
‘qualified privacy’, because the buffers between individuals’ dwellings are 
removed (ibid.) [2]. 
The importance of both conceptions of home has been once more 
highlighted by dictatorial practices in the 20th century in Europe. The 
extensive use of indoors/covert surveillance and expropriations were both 
a way to remove the protection afforded by the home. The first allowed at 
once finding out dissenters and instilling the Orwellian fear58 of being 
constantly checked, today referred to as ‘chilling effect’, whereas the latter 
was a way of socializing non-conforming individuals (Arendt 1960). 
However, the dictatorial experiences may have played a lesser role, given 
that the entitlement to the protection of the home had already gained legal 
protection. Nevertheless, currently the inviolability of the home is 
apprehended as part of the wider reasoning on private life, as the ECtHR 
noted recently in the case of Stolyarova v Russia, where it opined that “the 
margin of appreciation in housing matters is narrower when it comes to 
the rights guaranteed by Article 8 [than it is for those guaranteed by in 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1], because Article 8 concerns rights of central 
importance to the individual’s identity, self-determination, physical and 
moral integrity, maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and 
secure place in the community”.59 
 
 
57  The article of Warren and Brandeis is a case in point. 
58  For a discussion of the continued relevance of the panoptic element (implicit in 
Orwell’s surveillance) in contemporary forms of surveillance, see Linder in this 
volume. 




The understanding of the home as a safe haven from public authority 
and from society may be challenged by information and communication 
technologies, for instance in the form of self-surveillance.60  
4.1.4 The right’s fourth limb: (Confidential) communications 
Perhaps the value of communications, which encompass every form of 
spoken and written interaction, is the most self-explanatory: it is our 
primary tool of interaction and exchange, the way how we express our 
needs and ourselves. Arendt (1998) reminds us that communications play 
an important role in intimacy: expression modulates intimacy, to the 
extreme point that, once uttered, certain experiences lose their individual 
character altogether (as in the case of pain61). It is also crucial in the 
construction of the self (Taylor 1989). If identity building is a relational 
process, and relationships are partly substantiated through language, then 
communications and language (ibid) must have always been relevant in 
this respect. Perhaps it is for the immediate appeal of communications, 
and their strong relation with intimacy, that eminent scholars (Westin 
1967; Fried 1984) identified privacy with the control over knowledge 
about oneself. Although I agree with Reiman’s (1984) rebuttal of that 
equation, it must be kept in mind that control over knowledge about 
(including originating from) oneself is part of the legal right of the 
definition, particularly ensuring the confidentiality of communications. 
Confidentiality can be described as the ability to ensure that a message 
and the information contained therein reach the intended recipient(s) only. 
Similarly to the previous two sections, here I approach the value of 
communications in relation to its support to personhood, identity and 
autonomy as the quintessential function of the right. As before, the 
specific needs embodied by communications have acquired legal 
significance through a series of enhancing and limiting factors.  
As for the enhancing factors, the link between communications and 
identity has been made explicit in Romanticism, when the creation of the 
 
 
60  An innovative perspective of self-surveillance is offered by Michele Rapoport in 
this volume. The extent to which individuals will embrace the changes she 
depicts could testify to an important paradigm shift. 
61  According to Arendt, the very act of uttering one’s pain detaches the experience 
from the individual and breaks the link with her intimacy. 
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self through expression and language was bridged with art. Uniqueness 
turned being true to oneself, i.e. creating oneself regardless of constraining 
moral codes and the demands of others, into a goal in itself (Taylor 1989) 
[1]. It follows that the expropriation of one’s communications, through 
recourse to surveillance of any kind, or the threat thereof, can prove 
particularly harmful for the creation of the individual’s image of herself 
[2]. 
If the environment does not offer reassurances of confidentiality, forms 
of cryptography are used. The attempt to infuse communications with 
confidentiality through cryptography for political reasons has existed since 
antiquity, as much as interception for political needs, as exemplified by 
the surveillance undergone by one of Italy’s founding fathers, Mazzini 
(Lepore 2013). In this respect, fascist and totalitarian regimes have not 
particularly ‘excelled’, in that the violation of private correspondence is 
certainly not their invention (Kahn 2006). Nor does the temptation to 
violate communications confine itself to dictatorial regimes, as Snowden’s 
revelations remind us. While by no means constituting the only relevant 
technological development, information and communication technologies 
(from the telegraph to the Internet) are associated with the tools enabling 
the deepest intrusion. And yet, communications stand out as one of the 
entitlements most cherished throughout Europe’s history (Kahn 2006). 
4.2 Giving normative-legal value to the right to personal data protection 
(art. 8 of the Charter) 
Article 8 reads  
“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis 
of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down 
by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected 
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with these 
rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.”  
Data are pieces of raw information that concern an identified individual, 
or that enable her identification (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
2007).!
Similarly to that done for the right to private life, this section intends to 
show the value of personal data protection enshrined in article 8 of the 
Charter, by reasoning on the historical conditions of its appearance, due to 
the scant hints contained in the travaux préparatoires to article 8 of the 
Charter (Lynskey 2015). In doing so, I draw on the work of several 
 
 
‘privacy’ scholars. Here I also undertake a law and society approach to 
give back value to the right, but in a slightly different manner than that 
followed for the right to respect for private and family life, in that I detach 
accounts on the appearance of the notion from its value. This is an 
intentional choice, because I want to describe its value vis-à-vis the right 
to private life in order to differentiate the two. I begin by referring to the 
historical progression leading to the adoption of the right, in which context 
I highlight the four moves described above: the factors that enhanced the 
surfacing of the existence of the concept of personal data [1a], and that 
challenged its protection [2]; and the mechanism that favoured a legal 
approach to the concept [3] and the political occurrences that subsequently 
spurred its recognition as a right [4]. Then, I move on to describing 
personal data protection’s value [1b], as partly in synergy with and partly 
different from private life. 
4.2.1 The emergence of the notion of personal data protection 
Westin’s point whereby a new need enters the realm of freedom when it is 
both enhanced and challenged applies to personal data protection. As 
above, I believe a brief account of the mechanisms at play is instrumental 
in better grasping the value of the right. 
The appearance of the notion of personal data is certainly related to the 
ability of the state to collect encompassing information on its citizens for 
the purposes of censuses, and the implementation of public welfare 
measures (Rodotà 1973). But the invention of computerized systems and 
the unprecedented (personal) data processing capabilities they enabled 
perhaps plays the biggest role. González Fuster (2014) notes that in the 
original version of ‘data protection’, the German Datenschutz, Daten 
indicates data processed by a computer system, rather than raw 
information. A relatively small invention, the so-called ‘search function,’ 
which allowed to select the desired words or portion of content in a text, 
led to impressive business opportunities, notably building searchable, 
refined databases for both the public and private sectors 
(Eriksson/Giacomello 2012). This, in turn, enabled the development of a 
fundamental feature: the (trans-border) ‘flows’ of personal information, 
whereby data containing personal information were exchanged, point-to-
point, to support bureaucracy, to supply national and international 
businesses (shipping, travelling), or as a business itself (e.g. marketing) 
[1a]. 
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Yet, those same developments would soon show their problematic face. 
Simitis (2010) recalls how the early debate on computers was dominated 
by Norbert Wiener (the father of cybernetics) and Frank, who saw in 
‘cybernetic machines’ a way to rationalize society, allowing objective 
decisions to be taken. The enthusiastic approach that led to building the 
databanks of the Land of Hessen in the mid-60s cooled down when the 
surveillance capabilities of processing the health and income-related data 
of most of the population of the Land started being questioned [2]. The 
outcome was the adoption of the Data Protection Act of the State of 
Hessen in 1970. The act was able to benefit from earlier discussions in the 
US Congress (Simitis 2010), based on Westin’s work (González Fuster 
2014), taking place between 1966 and 1968. The interaction of the 
uncovering of surveillance-related scandals (Rodotà 1973; Newman 
2008), and the adoption of pioneering legal instruments, triggered 
comprehensive academic and legal reflections on the possible impact on 
human rights, at the time expressed in terms of privacy, and the 
establishment of international thematic commissions producing reports, 
studies, and international declarations, such as the United Nations’ 1975 
Declaration.62 
It was the opposing needs of profiting from the market potential of the 
flow of data, and the dangers a wild flow could provoke, which pushed the 
matter into the legal realm [3]. The US spread the successful legacy of 
Fair Information Principles (hereafter FIPs), standards to treat information 
fairly and avoid unwelcome effects while benefitting from the flow of data 
(Gellman 2012). Firstly applied in the US in the 1974 Privacy Act, and 
further refined in 1977, FIPs informed the Privacy Guidelines of the 
OECD,63 and Convention 108, both of which use the expression ‘privacy’ 
to refer to the protection of personal data. Both instruments dealt with the 
need to reconcile the smooth trans-border flow of personal data, in the 
light of their increasing economic importance, with the protection of the 
individuals concerned. The advent of the information society has 
exacerbated such tension, to the point that, depending on the preferred 
reading of article 8, the flow may have acquired the role of intrinsic 
balance to the protection of personal data (González Fuster 2014). 
 
 
62  General Assembly of the United Nations, Declaration on the Use of Scientific 
and Technological Progress in the interest of Peace and for the benefit of 
Mankind (Thirtieth Session, 2400th plenary meeting, 1975). 
63  OECD Privacy Guidelines. 
 
 
Supra (section 3) I mentioned that the EU originally took an 
instrumental approach to data protection. The EU began addressing the 
matter around 1973 to harmonize Member States’ approach, and at the 
same time counter the commercial and legal dominance of the United 
States in the field (González Fuster 2014). While Convention 108 was 
initially deemed sufficient to address personal data protection, it was the 
adoption of the Schengen Convention that spurred the need to adopt more 
substantial legislation at Member States’ level and, in the face of the lack 
of harmonization and the waxing information society (Bangemann et al. 
1994), a Directive. The inclusion of article 8 into the Charter, which paved 
the way to the end of an instrumental approach to it, was the modernising 
result (Piris 2010) of the favourable presence of several ‘personal data 
protection’ activists among the members of the drafting Convention 
(González Fuster 2014) [4]. Thus far, I have hinted only indirectly at the 
value embodied by the right, to which I turn in the following two 
paragraphs. 
4.2.2. Personal data bearing value synergic with private life, with a twist 
I agree with González Fuster (2014) that modern information technology, 
although crucial, is insufficient alone to explain the elevation of personal 
data protection to a right [4]. In part, the right aims to protect the same 
values underpinning private life; the two rights meet at the intersection of 
identity, autonomy and dignity [1b]. I see this relationship as one of 
synergy, rather than dependence of personal data protection on private 
life. This holds true also in the partly related case of personal data 
embodying information concerning the private life of the individual, from 
which I begin my discussion.64 
 
 
64  While I agree with Lynskey’s (2015) conclusion that the right to personal data 
protection should be treated as a fully-fledged independent right, I believe that 
the three models she uses to explain the origins of the right to personal data 
protection are complementary, rather than standing in opposition. The first finds 
its roots in dignity–based personality rights, stemming from the German legal 
tradition; she finds some explanatory purchase in them, in that it can explain the 
fact that harms can ensue from the processing of un-risky data, and has support in 
the informational self-development case law. The second and most accredited 
model finds that data protection stems from private life; while it can explain the 
overlap between private life and data protection, she finds that it is not supported 
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Whenever personal data contain information that allows reconstructing 
details about the private life, social circles or communications that 
individuals would rather keep private, there is a clear and manifest overlap 
between the objects the two rights seek to protect, which usually is 
intimacy (individual and relational) functional to personhood and identity. 
In this case, the only difference that could be traced is the one found by 
Rodotà (2009). On the one hand, the right to private and family life tends 
to be static, in that it relates to the physical and spatial dimension of the 
individual. On the other hand, the right to personal data protection is 
dynamic, in that it refers to data by their nature detached from the person 
and susceptible to flow. In this respect, protecting personal data equals 
stepping up protection of intimacy; this is a possible reading, for instance, 
of the Google v. Spain case.65 
A second, connected point of overlap concerns the fact that both rights 
aim at keeping solid control of the process overseeing the creation of 
one’s identity (and, relatedly, dignity and autonomy). If we agree that 
information concerning intimacy is itself an integral part of intimacy, and 
we accept that gatekeeping one’s intimacy is required to foster the creation 
of independent identities, then, gatekeeping one’s intimate information (of 
which Westin’s (1967) notion of control is an aspect (Reiman 1984, 
1995)) is crucial for identity and, relatedly, autonomy. This was the sense 
of the landmark judgment pronounced by the German Constitutional Court 
in relation to the regulation of census, and which was crucial in the 
construction of a European culture of the protection of personal data. In 
1983 the Court claimed that individuals have a “right to informational 
self-determination” deriving directly from article 1 (1) and 2 (1) of the 
German Constitution (the Basic Law) whereby the rights to freedom are 
inviolable (Poullet/Rouvroy 2009). The judgment reads 
“Those who cannot understand with sufficient certainty which information related 
to him or her is known to certain segments of his social environment, and who is 
 
by case law. The third is that personal data and privacy overlap but are different; 
while she finds that there is some traction in the literature, she prefers this model 
because she finds it is better supported by case law. I believe these models are 
not in contradiction, but rather they are complementary. First, there was a general 
rediscovery of personality rights based on dignity, which I argue private life rests 
upon; the appearance of personal data protection, serving similar purposes, was 
immediately linked to private life (just like private life had been linked to 
property rights); time proved the usefulness of having two rights which merit to 
be treated independently, but the common origin and purpose testify to an 
overlap. 
65  Judgment in Google Spain and Google, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317. 
 
 
not able to assess to a certain degree the knowledge of his potential 
communication partners, can be hindered profoundly in their freedom of self-
determination to plan and to decide. The right of informational self-determination 
stands against a societal order and its underlying legal order in which citizens 
cannot know any longer who knows what about them when and in which 
situations.”66 
Having said that, I believe the two rights oversee the protection of 
identity differently, and Rodotà’s distinction can be useful to exemplify 
this. Individuals need a physical and emotional margin of manoeuvre, a 
material or ideal space where they can feel free to develop their 
personality; this is where the right to private life comes into play. 
Individuals, however, need also reassuring that, once that personality is 
expressed, its integrity can be protected against direct or indirect attempts 
to deny its richness. In a society preoccupied by the need to categorise the 
behaviour of individuals according to standards, for the sake of planning 
and regulating economic activities, and where behaviour is conditioned 
according to status (particularly the function or role undertaken (Arendt 
1998)), profiling67 (Kuehn/Mueller 2012), helped by big data (Kuner et al. 
2012), appears alluring. There has been no shortage of attempts to justify a 
commercialization of personal data based on the economic potential they 
carry, which, however, “ignore the full social costs of data use” (Simitis 
2010, 1999). Profiling removes the power of individuals to make (and 
change) claims about who they are. Retaining control over personal data 
allows the individual to oppose being seen as a conditioned animal 
 
 
66 65 BVerfGE 1, (1983), Volkszählungsurteil para 154. “Wer nicht mit 
hinreichender Sicherheit überschauen kann, welche ihn betreffende 
Informationen in bestimmten Bereichen seiner sozialen Umwelt bekannt sind, 
und wer das Wissen möglicher Kommunikationspartner nicht einigermaßen 
abzuschätzen vermag, kann in seiner Freiheit wesentlich gehemmt werden, aus 
eigener Selbstbestimmung zu planen oder zu entscheiden. Mit dem Recht auf 
informationelle Selbstbestimmung wären eine Gesellschaftsordnung und eine 
diese ermöglichende Rechtsordnung nicht vereinbar, in der Bürger nicht mehr 
wissen können, wer was wann und bei welcher Gelegenheit über sie weiß.” 
(retrieved here: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv065001.html). A translation of 
some fundamental passages of the case is available at: 
https://freiheitsfoo.de/census-act/. 
67  Article 4.4 of the GDPR defines profiling as “any form of automated processing 
of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal 
aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects 
concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health, 
personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements.” 
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(Arendt 1998), whereby association to a flat category crushes his or her 
richness. It could be useful in this respect to recall Reiman’s (1995) four 
risks entailed by the collection of personal data: the risk of extrinsic loss 
of freedom (the chilling effect), the risk of intrinsic loss of freedom (the 
actual limitation of the right), symbolic risks (impinging on the 
individual’s ownership of oneself), and the risk of psychopolitical 
metamorphosis (infantilizing adults, turning them into Marcuse’s one-
dimensional man). 
Recital 75 of the GDPR acknowledges that: “… where personal aspects 
are evaluated, in particular analysing or predicting aspects concerning 
performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences or 
interests, reliability or behaviour, location or movements, in order to 
create or use personal profiles”, there is a “risk to the rights and freedoms 
of natural persons” which could lead to “physical, material or non-material 
damage”. It is in this light that profiling of children is inadvisable, as they 
“may be less aware of the risks, consequences and safeguards concerned 
and their rights in relation to the processing of personal data” (recital 38 of 
the GDPR). 
4.2.3 The independence of personal data protection 
There are instances, however, in which personal data embody information 
which does not immediately unveil details on one’s private life. 
Kranenborg (2008) and Lynskey (2015) note that the ECtHR has 
systematically denied protection to such data which, instead, fall within 
the purview of article 8 of the Charter (Kokott/Sobotta 2013). The 
importance of protecting data is intimately linked to contemporary 
advances in informatics spurred by the Internet (Rodotà 2014). 
First, cloud computing detaches the data from a physical location 
(Armbrust et al. 2009), and once in the cloud, data is difficult to tame 
(Gayrel et al. 2010). Big data (Jones 2012; Tene/Polonetsky 2012) aims at 
stacking as much data as possible in unique databases (following the 
encouraging results of using large databases in science and meteorology) 
in the hope that producing vast haystacks will enable identifying the 
desired ‘needles’. Big data challenges the principle of purpose limitation 
and data minimisation, in that data are not collected and exchanged for 
limited purposes by known data controllers, and there is an incentive to 
collect as many data as possible; this has triggered discussions about a 
new facet of the right to data protection, the right to be forgotten, or the 
 
 
ultimate deletion of one’s data.68 The Internet of Things merges the two 
approaches: everyday objects connect to the Internet and their 
information, stored in the cloud, leads to ever-bigger data. 
Second, personal data is also exposed to cybercrime and cyber 
surveillance, which begs the question of whether protecting data is akin to 
protecting information systems in accordance with the information 
security canons. The question was partly answered by the German 
Constitutional Court when it declared unconstitutional a North-Rhine 
Westphalia Law allowing the domestic intelligence services to secretly 
search online private computers, to the effect of recognizing that 
confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems 
(computers, networks and other IT systems) form part of the tenets of data 
protection (derived from articles 1(1) and 2(1) of the German Basic Law), 
adding to informational self-determination (Hülsmann et al. 2011).69 
The bottom line of such dramatic and entrenched developments of 
informatics is manifold. On the one hand, it is not possible to anticipate 
the way how personal data can be used. Hence the rationale of a right: all 
personal data deserve protection irrespective of the immediate danger 
posed by their processing. However, in order to accommodate legitimate 
processing (which “should be designed to serve mankind”, recital 4 of the 
GDPR), the exact technical, organizational and legal measures enacted to 
safeguard data will depend on the assessment of the (known) risk posed by 
the processing according to a well-established risk-based approach.70 The 
GDPR refers to generic risks,71 significant or high risks to the rights and 
freedoms of natural persons which may lead to physical, material or non-
 
 
68  See in this respect C-131/12 - Google Spain and Google. 
69 The decision extends the protection of personal data enshrined in article 10 of the 
German Basic Law “to ways of processing, which, in a narrower interpretation, 
do not fall under telecommunications, in particular to the contents of computer-
hard disks and the use of Internet services. The new basic right supports the right 
to informational self-determination and thus takes the new risks into account, 
which the increasing networking of IT-systems involves.” See the press release 
of the judgment at: 
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cln_007/nn_672850/EN/PublicRelations/PressReleases/
2008/07-08-OnlineSearches.html%3E. 
70  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Statement on the role of a risk-based 
approach in data protection legal frameworks, WP 218 (2014). 
71  References to risk are found in recitals 15 (risk of circumvention), recital 24, 
recital 28, 38, 65, 71, 74-77, 80, 81, 83, 85, 96, 98, as well as articles 24.1, 25.1, 
27.2(a), 30.5, 32, 33, 35.7(c)(d) and 35.11, 36, and 39.2. 
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material damage (recital 75), as well as data security risks (recital 83). If 
fully anonymised data are not considered personal data any longer, 
pseudonymised data (article 4(5) of the GDPR) pose low risk. The so-
called sensitive data pose significant risks (recital 51), whereas high risks 
follow from a specific assessment, e.g. in relation to data breaches or new 
technologies.72 By means of example, recital 75 indicates the risk to 
discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, damage to reputation, 
loss of confidentiality of personal data protected by professional secrecy, 
unauthorised reversal of pseudonymisation, a significant economic or 
social disadvantage, the deprivation of the exercise of one’s data rights, 
the processing of special categories of sensitive data and of vulnerable 
people, or processing on a large-scale basis. 
On the other hand, personal data collected for different legitimate 
purposes can be crossed without consent to lead to decisions that affect the 
individual in very material ways. It is not a coincidence that both the 
GDPR and the revised Convention 108 insist that automated decisions, i.e. 
decisions that do not involve human agency, undergo heightened 
controls.73 Decisions based on automated processing stem from a partial 
depiction of the individual, which is based on the expropriation of the 
control over identity and (digital) personality. Recital 71 of the GDPR 
recommends such decisions not to concern a child (in the GDPR, a child 
aged 13 or under), and offers examples of the negative effects of such 
decisions on the data subject, e.g. “automatic refusal of an online credit 
application or e-recruiting practices without any human intervention”. 
To act differently would lead to a loss of autonomy, but in a more 
subtle, and thus more dangerous, way (Arendt 1998). It is for this reason 
that it is crucial to safeguard ‘the digital/electronic persona’ as distinct 
from the physical persona (Rodotà 2009), needing specific legal 
protection, substantiated in procedural rights safeguarding the use of 
personal information, as indeed is the case of paragraph two and three of 
article 8 of the Charter.74  
 
 
72  The GDPR refers to high risk in recitals 76, 77, 84, 86, 90, 91 and articles 34 and 
35. 
73  In a similar vein, see the recent European Parliament draft Report with 
recommendations over the personality and responsibility of artificial intelligence 
(European Parliament 2016). 
74  On the relevance of the second paragraph of the article to trace a neat line 
between article 7 and 8, see also Kokott and Sobotta (2013). 
 
 
In this respect, personal data protection can be assimilated to a 
procedural right akin to non-discrimination, understood as a measure of 
accessibility (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2012), other than availability, of goods and services. Its function is to 
prevent individuals suffering from a spiral of other human rights 
infringements, including but not limited to the right to respect for private 
and family life, as well as affecting the realization of a substantive right.75  
Indeed, personal data protection can be seen as serving as the necessary 
basis for the enjoyment of other civil and political rights such as freedom 
of expression, association, assembly (Poscher/Miller 2013), and 
movement, which could not be effectively enjoyed otherwise. 
Certainly it will be for the CJEU to provide a final answer on the 
independence of personal data. The CJEU could rely on article 52.2 of the 
Charter concerning rights derived from the Treaties (as could be the case 
of personal data protection). Furthermore, the Court’s adoption of 
definitions contained in secondary law could play to the advantage of 
article 8. The new GDPR, in fact, does not formulate rules on personal 
data protection in subsidiary terms to private life. In this respect, the CJEU 
may follow the same approach as in Fisher, by embracing the 
Regulation’s formulation before it enters into force. 
4.3 The value of articles 7 and 8 for the EU ordre public 
Fascist and totalitarian regimes demonstrated the dangerous consequences 
of crushing the four dimensions of the legal definition of the right to 
respect for private and family life discussed in this article, to the extent 
that “the rise of totalitarianism…its consistent non-recognition of civil 
rights, above all the right to privacy, makes us doubt not only of the 
coincidence of politics with freedom, but their very compatibility” (Arendt 
1960, 30). Reiman recalls Goffman’s studies concerning the impact of 
total institutions on the self, whose mortification of the self passes through 
the removal of any privacy” (1984, 310). Totalitarian regimes crushed 
private and family life, home and correspondence with the use of ideology 
 
 
75  For a similar conclusion, see Poscher and Miller (2013), for whom the right to 
informational self-determination is anticipatory in nature, in that it “anticipates a 
potential harm resulting from the collection, storage and use of personal 
information”. 
The recrudescence of ‘security v. privacy’ after the 2015 terrorist attacks, and the 
value of ‘privacy rights’ in the European Union 
 
and terror, with a view to curbing individuals’ spontaneity and leeway for 
action, and substituted autonomy with automatic processes (Arendt 1960). 
By stifling spontaneity of political action, what Arendt called 
Machiavelli’s virtù (ibid), regimes76 would neutralize the possibility to 
effect social change. 
The same could be argued about personal data. The physical 
elimination of ‘the enemy’ in the wake of WWII would often pass through 
lists of dissidents and their ethnical or religious affiliations. However, it 
was perhaps the 20th century dictatorial regimes in Europe and reactions to 
the Cold War that showed the widest consequences of the collection of 
personal data to categorize individuals between friends and foes, chill the 
autonomy of the former and seriously imperil that of the latter.  
Our modern democracies are founded on the (ideal) notion of the 
autonomous citizen endowed with a unique identity, worthy of equal 
respect because of one’s intrinsic dignity, who retains liberty, the freedom 
to act politically, at a minimum through voting, and the prerogative to 
request the correct application of the rule of law. The ECtHR opined that 
“although no previous case has established as such any right to self-
determination as being contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court 
considers that the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle 
underlying the interpretation of its guarantees” including “a right to 
personal development”.77 A polity based on the (ideal of the) rule of law is 
a polity of autonomous citizens (Bobbio 1997), as supposedly is the EU 
pursuant to its Treaties. 
Independent identities enabling autonomy cannot be developed without 
enjoying the four limbs enshrined in article 7 of the Charter, because 
“privacy prevents interference, pressures to conform, ridicule, punishment, 
unfavorable decisions, and other forms of hostile reaction. To the extent 
that privacy does this, it functions to promote liberty of action, removing 
the unpleasant consequences of certain actions and thus increasing the 
liberty to perform” (Gavison 1984, 363-364).78 Similarly, they cannot be 
developed without the enjoyment of the protection of personal data, which 
 
 
76  Cohen (2013) compellingly argues that this is not only the case of political 
regimes, but also of democracies and liberal economies based on modulated 
surveillance. See also Poullet and Rouvroy (2009). 
77  Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, CE:ECHR:2002:0429JUD00234602, 
paragraph 61. 
78  See the risks found by Reiman (1995) described in section 4.2.2. 
 
 
prevents individuals from being infantilised and seen as a conditioned 
animal, whereby association to a flat category crushes his or her richness 
and stifles the ability to behave autonomously (supra, section 4.2.2). 
It would be foolish to rely on the work of the past to enjoy such 
prerogatives if the understanding of their significance is not kept alive, 
particularly in the face of the repeated challenges of terrorism. But it 
would also be foolish to believe that we could afford oblivion if and when 
the terrorist threat is over. In her essay, Cohen discusses the dangers of 
sleepwalking in a modulated democracy, where we allow the creation of 
surveillance infrastructures that organize the world for us, force us to look 
at the world through their lenses, and are ultimately exploited “by 
powerful commercial and political interests” (2013, 1912).79 
5. Conclusions 
In these pages I have attempted to show that the understanding of privacy 
subsumed by the trade-off model is flawed with respect to EU law. I have 
done so by considering that the trade-off model flattens privacy rights by 
removing their normative depth, or importance, which I have tried to re-
establish through a ‘law and society’-based analysis of the right to respect 
for private and family life, and the right to the protection of personal data 
as understood in the EU. Contextually, I have sought to demonstrate that 
both rights are crucial in a EU legal framework oriented towards a solid 
application of the rule of law, preventing dictatorship to take roots and its 
members to descend in a war, in that they foster that autonomy that solely 
can perpetrate and maintain democracy. 
Of the many conclusions that can be drawn, one is that the statement 
“trading-off security with privacy” grows ever emptier, as the two terms 
are incommensurable. Earlier I announced I would address a way to make 
the two terms commensurable, e.g. for the sake of appraising the 
efficiency of measures. Accordingly, the trade-off would have to be 
reformulated, by substituting ‘security’ with the specific measures used to 
tackle offences, and ‘privacy’ with its legally relevant dimensions. One 
could take as an example one limb of the (much debated) definition of 
 
 
79  In this respect, see the very interesting dystopic forecast made by Lanier (2013). 
The recrudescence of ‘security v. privacy’ after the 2015 terrorist attacks, and the 
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terrorism applicable in the EU,80 and obtain the following substitute for 
the trade-off model: using the method/tool X to combat (prevent) the 
“seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport” at 
the expense of the protection of personal data as embodiment of 
autonomy. Only then could a serious proportionality test be applied. 
This reformulation begs the question: how important are autonomous 
citizens endowed with equally valuable identities through their dignity and 
taking part in a democratic society based on the rule of law? As Advocate 
General Saugmandsgaard Øe said,  
“the requirement of proportionality strictu senso implies weighing the advantages 
resulting from (a) measure in terms of the legitimate objective pursued against the 
disadvantages it causes in terms of the fundamental rights enshrined in a 
democratic society. This particular requirement therefore opens a debate about the 
values that must prevail in a democratic society and, ultimately, about what kind 
of society we wish to live in.”81 
Here lies the importance of privacy rights and, contextually, the real 
nature of the EU ordre public. 
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